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Abstract
The dramatic rise in the disability insurance (DI) rolls in the last 20 years has been the
subject of much controversy. While the relationship between DI and labor force
participation has been the subject of a growing literature, the mechanism of this
transition from employment to DI remains unclear. We hypothesize that one
mechanism is the state-level administration of the program which creates a classic
principal-agent problem. We analyze the conflict of interests for Disability
Determination Services agencies between Social Security Administration (SSA)
standards and state gubernatorial political interests interacted with the increased
demand for disability insurance as an alternative for low-skilled employment during the
period of 1982 to 2013. We find evidence that multi-term governors allow a greater
fraction of applicants than do first-term governors, but only up to year 2000, when
allowance rates started to decrease over time. We develop a model that illustrates how
these differences can be due to the type of monitoring conducted by the SSA. We
provide additional evidence supporting this hypothesis analyzing how the effects
interact with economic and political constraints.
JEL codes: H55, I18, I38, G22
Keywords: Disability insurance; Principal-agent; Social security administration;
Monitoring
1 Introduction
The dramatic rise in disability insurance rolls (DI from now on) in the last 20 years has
been the subject of much controversy in both popular and academic circles. Both theory
and empirical evidence have found what appears to be labor market consequences from
the expansion of DI but with the general assumption that marginally able individuals are
able to enter DI when they are unable to find employment with a sufficiently high wage.
From this assumption arises the question of whether the administrators of DI are sim-
ply attempting to expand DI enrolment during times of economic hardships or lack the
evidence to distinguish between the increased number marginal candidates who arrive
economic downturns.
The structure of the disability system establishes conflicting incentives for states and
the Social Security Administration (SSA). Unlike the federal government, which has an
incentive to cost minimize by reducing caseloads, state governors have an interest in
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increasing them. This is for two reasons. First, if individuals applying for DI are denied
they may apply for other forms of social welfare for which states bear the cost. To the
extent that governors seek to cost-minimize with respect to their own social programs,
they will attempt to admit more marginally disabled individuals into the federal DI pro-
gram. Second, the removal of these individuals from the ranks of the unemployed may
allow a change in the perception of state level economic performance. This could affect
the governor’s political capital or re-election prospects.
This study uses several facts about the DI program administrative procedure to deter-
mine the role political gaming by governors may play in expanding disability rolls: the
inherent principal-agent tension from the federal-funding, state-administration struc-
ture; the political gains for governors from lower unemployment rates; and, the lack of
oversight in program administration.
Principal-agent Issues Any scholars have noted, there is an inherent principal-agent
issue in the administration of DI because it is fully federally funded but entirely state-
administered. By law, disability determinations are made by state agencies under contract
with the Social Security Administration. The head of this agency, the director of Dis-
ability Determination Services (DDS), is appointed by the governor and the staff of this
agency is comprised of state employees. This naturally generates a conflict of interest for
these agencies which depend on the federal government for funding, but remain under
the administrative and political direction of state governors. DDS caseworkers are well
aware of the various incentives. A DDS state director claimed that he “would probably be
discharged if he followed a strict interpretation of SSA guidelines” (United States General
Accounting Office 1978; Berkowitz 1987). Disability examiners follow such sentiments.
According to the same source one examiner claimed, “We are state employees; therefore,
we don’t have to pay attention to what the SSA regional office . . . or any other federal
agency says” (United States General Accounting Office 1978).
Moreover, in a series of studies Keiser (1999, 2001, 2010) presents evidence about this
principal-agent problem. Her 2001 study shows that state bureaucrats reduce access to
the disability federal program when state governments incur costs associated with those
programs, especially under conditions of fiscal stress. In a recent survey of DDS exam-
iners, Keiser (2010) finds that examiners who believe that DDS offices should be most
accountable to federal taxpayers have lower allowance rates (about 6 percent) than those
who believe DDS offices should be most accountable to citizens in their state1.
Political gains for governors The observed link between unemployment rates and
gubernatorial popularity suggests that governors may have a strategic interest in reduc-
ing, or appearing to reduce, the unemployment rate2. Recent work byWolfers (2007) puts
a finer point on this, illustrating that voters systematically make attribution errors regard-
ing responsibility for negative economic conditions. Thus governors may face political
fallout for economic conditions and may wish to use any mechanisms at their disposal to
improve the welfare and economic well-being of their constituents. Moreover, admission
into DI depends on the presentation of evidence that a worker is unable to work. Such
evidence often involves evidence of injury or illness related pain, which may be difficult
to assess and document by non-specialists; doctors typically provide evidence. The type
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of doctor and the nature of evidence that is sufficient to determine disability can vary the
cost and difficulty in receiving and continuing to receive disability benefits.
Lack of oversight The SSA during this period had very little direct oversight and only
period reviews. Later reforms would increase oversight but during significant periods of
time, there was little monitoring by the principal (in this case, SSA), reducing the risk of
detecting or deterring politically gaming allowance rates.
Taken together the difficult in observing many disabilities and the political incentives
to reduce unemployment suggests that governors, if sufficiently motivated, could expand
disability rolls3. This would have been quickly observed and corrected, however, were it
not for the lax monitoring and oversight by the SSA. Thus this paper addresses ques-
tions regarding the interaction between legal rulings, administrative procedures, and
labor market participation. To what extent did the rise of subjective admission criteria
allow political actors to influence DI enrolment? While evidence that the rise in disabil-
ity occurred after the 1984 liberalization of DI policies is presented in Autor and Duggan
(2003), the question of to what extent this is related to political motives is difficult to
ascertain from aggregate trends. This is especially true for disability insurance which dur-
ing many time periods appears to have been administered in largely uniform ways. To
answer this question we therefore rely on the overlap in periods with greater discretion
and the type of monitoring used by the SSA.
Using a simplified model of delegation, we illustrate that a lax monitoring process can
allow governors with a preference for higher allowance rates to learn how much they can
safely increase acceptance rates without consequences. Because this learning occurs over
time, we can compare multi-term governors to single-term governors during the same
time periods4.
We show that while DI rates began rising as early as 1984, multi-term and single term
governors’ rates did not begin to diverge until 1986, when the introduction of evidence
from treating physicians (rather than SSA physicians) was allowed by a court ruling. The
divergence continued to grow until 1993 when evidentiary standards on pain were tight-
ened and closed almost entirely by 1996 when the SSA issued a set of unifying evaluation
criteria. What role did this political influence on the disability determination process play
in the growth of the disability program? We find evidence that during periods in which
the returns to expansion are high, for example governors face unfavorable economic or
fiscal conditions, the acceptance rates among multiple term governors is higher. We also
provide some evidence that the differences we observe are due to a governor’s learning
rather than a selection mechanism by which governors with low allowance rates do not
survive to later terms. We also show that our results are not driven by electoral cycles.
Indeed, we don’t find evidence that allowance rates follow electoral cycles.
During the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties, disability insurance acceptance rates rose
nearly 15 percent. Our results suggest that at least 10 percent of that increase is due to
the gubernatorial influence on the allowance rates. The influence appears to be stronger
when allowance rates rise than when they fall. Starting in 2000, when acceptance rates
started plummeting, gubernatorial influence seems to have ceased.
This paper thus provides an important contribution linking two strands of literature: on
vote buying and on labor market effects of social welfare programs. In particular, previ-
ous work has documented that political pressure and institutional design can combine to
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impact the administration of government programs. The results of this paper thus corrob-
orate a growing body of literature that highlights the importance of political institutions
on the public expenditure decisions and the use of spending to “buy off” voters5. There is
also substantial evidence regarding the impact of disability benefits on labor force partic-
ipation in the United States and internationally6. While previous work has systematically
documented both these issues, this paper provides a mechanism linking the outcome of
individual decisions (i.e. to avoid work for sufficiently generous public welfare alterna-
tives) and political mechanisms that facilitate such behavior. In this case, the steep rise
in the number of individuals on disability insurance is clearly linked to the rising accep-
tance rates. This increased acceptance rate could only occur when governors had enough
flexibility in determination processes to allow more marginally disabled individuals onto
disability rolls. The results of this paper thus indicate an important potential mechanism
that has been under-explored: the role of political institutions in facilitating issues of
moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance, tax and public welfare provisions.
2 Background information
The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides income and medical benefits to indi-
viduals eligible for disability insurance under the Social Securities Act (1935)7. The
provision of these benefits occurs through two programs:
• Social Security Disability Insurance (DI): Established under Title II of the Social
Security Act, DI is a social insurance program. It is intended to protect workers who
become disabled and therefore cannot (or at least cannot be expected to) work. Thus,
DI eligibility requires workers to be previously employed8. After age 65, DI benefits
are converted to Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI).
• Supplementary Security Insurance (SSI): Established under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act, SSI is means-tested, intended to protect individuals with limited
income and assets who would not otherwise qualify for SSDI. SSI beneficiaries can
continue to receive benefits past age 65.
Both programs use the same health criteria to determine eligibility. The Social Secu-
rity definition requires an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determined physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months9”. “Substantial gainful activity” is defined as working on a regu-
lar and continuing basis and earning over $830 a month (in 2005)10. The disability must
be “demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques”.
This restriction is not overly strict in part due to the liberalization of the DI program that
occurred in 1984.
Among other issues, this liberalization relaxed many of the requirements that governed
the determination process11. Thus the criteria for disability, while well-defined, are not
completely objective and leave room for discretion in the determination process.
2.1 Funding and administration
A crucial aspect of the federal DI/SSI system is that it is federally funded but administered
by the states, establishing conflicting incentives for both parties. This administration
occurs through the Disability Determination Services (DDS) offices in each state. These
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offices are part of state governments and are typically headed by an individual appointed
by the governor. This agency manages the disability insurance claims sent by the SSA field
office.
This state-based administrative mechanism was originally established to facilitate
coordination with existing state vocational rehabilitation agencies and to encourage
physician acceptance and participation in the disability insurance program12. However,
state management, subjective decision-making standards, and lack of federal over-
sight is believed to be responsible for the great deal of variation in the disability
allowance rates. State agencies are required to follow the regulations set by the SSA,
but there are relatively few federal requirements relating to their administrative prac-
tices. The agencies follow state established personnel policies with respect of such
matters as salaries, benefits, and educational requirements; do their own hiring; pro-
vide most of the training for adjudicators; follow their own quality assurance procedures;
and pay state-established reimbursement rates for purchase of medical evidence. This
results in different training and administrative practices that affect the determination
process.
Variation in training and practices is exacerbated by the increased subjectivity of the
determination process. Court decisions as well as changing perceptions about what
constitutes disability has resulted in a number of new policies that require individ-
ual judgment by those adjudicating disability applications. For example, all adjudicators
are required to assess subjective factors such as the credibility with respect to alle-
gations of pain and the weight that should be given to the opinion of a treating
source13.
Variation in health status, occupational composition, and demographical characteris-
tics across different states would naturally give rise to differences in allowance rates.
Determining the source of such variation, however, is important because the administra-
tive environment leaves DDS agencies vulnerable to the influence of state-level political
considerations. Indeed the General Accounting Office (GAO) reports concern about the
impact of politics on disability determinations given that all DDS employees were state
employees working for an executive agency14.
2.2 Legal history
The large growth in both the application and enrolment into the federal disability insur-
ance prompted a set of congressional legislative reforms in 1980 which formed the
backbone of the federal government’s effort to define the scope and limit the growth
of DI. SSA was required to review a specified percentage of State Disability Deter-
mination services allowances. This allowed for partial or complete take over from a
State Disability Determination services (DDS) the function of making disability deter-
minations if the DDS fails to follow federal regulations and guidelines or if the state
no longer wishes to make the determinations. Therefore this required the agency to
make own-motion reviews of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions (as opposed
to per request of an appellant). Most notably, the reforms also required continuing
disability reviews (CDRs) of DI benefits for non-permanently disabled beneficiaries
at least every three years. In order to define the scope of improvement, the Reform
Act also incorporated an amendment that was based on SSA’s policies on the eval-
uation of pain. The amendments also contained a number of provisions designed to
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encourage DI and SSI disability beneficiaries to return to work, including continua-
tion of benefits while the beneficiary is in vocational rehabilitation, the disregard of
certain work-related expenses, and facilitated reentitlement to benefits that were lost
after returning to work. The new rules established the need for a standard of pain
evaluation.
During the application and appeals process, medical evidence is critical to correctly
identifying whether an individual can be categorized as “disabled”. The procedures rely
on evidence from three difference sources: the treating physician, a consulting exam-
iner, and a medical advisor. The weight given to the treating physician evidence relative
to the other two sources may determine case outcomes but until 1991 was not uni-
formly applied to disability determinations (Schneider 1996). This formulation, often
left ambiguous by the courts, could then be set at the state level permitting greater
variation in the evidence provided by the individual’s treating physician, which was
generally thought to increase the likelihood of acceptance. This is because increased
weighting of physician testimony allows the increased weight of subjective measures
of pain and injury which treating physicians may testify to but government spon-
sored doctors (such as consulting examiner or medical advisor) may be unable to
observe. The weighting of this testimony became an issue of contention between the
SSA and the federal courts for almost 15 years. During that time period, changes in
the boundaries of SSA authority as well as the rights of disability applicants and recip-
ients generating changing standards of evaluation during the application and appeals
process.
Based on divergence and later convergence in administrative rules regarding the weight
to treating physician testimony there are three distinct periods of rules: 1982–1985,
1986–1992, and 1993–1996.
2.2.1 Period 1 (1982–1985): uniform standards on evidence of pain after 1980 reforms
Despite the 1980 legislation, a large number of newly denied or failed continuation
cases were being returned to DI by the courts. The reports of the Ways and Means
and Finance Committees on the 1980 amendments encouraged the courts to conform to
new legislative standards. Given the response of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals15
and the sense that “the review process mandated under the 1980 amendments. . .resulted
in some significant problems and dislocations which were not anticipated and which
contributed to an unprecedented degree of confusion in the operation of the program”,
Congress passed the Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-460). The Disabil-
ity Benefits Reform Act increased the evidential requirement necessary to demonstrate
improvement and ability to work as grounds to terminate benefits. This act also wrote
into the law for a temporary period SSA’s criteria for evaluating pain and required
the consideration of the cumulative effect of multiple disabilities. This increased the
allowance rate for applicants with commonmusculoskeletal conditions (i.e. back pain and
arthritis).
The importance of physician testimony arose in 1980 with the legislative change
and was then heightened by the 1984 reforms. However, while the 1984 reforms for-
mally relaxed previous standards, in practice it simply brought the administrative rules
from SSA into agreement with the Circuit courts nationwide. Rather than the 1984
legislative reforms, this study uses two changes regarding the inclusion of treating
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physician evidence on pain and injury, which increased the state DDS discretion even
further. While this issue is subtle, its potential for altering determinations is quite
significant.
2.2.2 Period 2 (1986–1992): variation in legal standards on evaluation of pain and physician
testimony
The second period was initiated when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (in Schisler
v. Heckler) stated that a treating physician’s opinion on the subject of medical disability
is binding unless contradicted by substantial evidence. Despite the fact that the Supreme
Court upheld the SSA determination procedures in Bowen v. Yuckert (1986) this increased
the DDS’s discretion even further, and introduced increased confusion about the 1984
SSA guidelines.
This restriction prompted a second effort to reduce state discretion and generate
uniformity. In 1988, SSA issued a new ruling on pain which restated the existing
policy in the 1984 amendments. But again, several courts did not conform to such
rulings. During this time period, four circuits were extremely vocal in their condem-
nation of the SSA standards and the unwillingness of the SSA to acquiesce to previous
court rulings: the Second Circuit (NY, CT, VT), the Fourth Circuit (MD, WV, VA,
NC, SC), the Eight Circuit (ND, SD, NE, MN, IA, MO, AR) and the Ninth Circuit
(MT, ID, NV, AZ, CA, OR, WA, AK, HI). The opposition to the SSA mean states
in the more controversial Circuits faced increased scrutiny and even legal review of
DDS decisions. Thus inadvertently, these Circuit court stances on SSA administra-
tive authority generated de facto variation in the extent of monitoring on disability
determinations16.
2.2.3 Period 3 (1993–1996): unification and training on SSA standards
The tide turned in 1993, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Schisler v. Sullivan
found that SSA’s 1991 regulations on the opinions of treating physicians, while they
departed in some ways from the court’s earlier opinion, were a valid use of the
agency’s regulatory power. Finally in 1996 SSA issued a set of nine Social Security
rulings commonly called process unification rulings and provided training on the rul-
ings for all disability adjudicators. The subjects of the rulings included the weight to
be given to treating source opinions and other medical opinions, the evaluation of
pain and other symptoms, the assessment of credibility and residual functional capac-
ity, and the application of federal court decisions. Thus after 1993, the uncertainty
was ended and a uniform treatment across DDSs of pain evaluation and treating
physician testimony was returned. But a reduced uncertainty did not reduce potential
discretion, as shown by the constant growth of awards for mental and musculoskele-
tal diagnosis types. Such disorders represented about 30 percent of the awardees in
1982, 40 percent 10 years later (1992), and almost 50 percent 20 years later (2002)
(U.S. Social Security Administration).
2.3 Monitoring and oversight by the SSA
The major shift toward treating physician testimony and subjective evidence of pain
was thus introduced by various legislative changes and court rulings in 1984, and con-
tinued through 1996. While the relaxation and later constriction of such subjectivity
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would be less problematic if the SSA administered the programs, the independence of
state-administered DDS was compounded by the relatively lax oversight and monitoring
provided by the SSA.
Prior to 1972, SSA conducted pre-effectuation review (PER) of all DDS decisions. In
1972, the federal review of DDS decisions was drastically reduced to a national sample
of five percent, conducted after the decision becomes effective. In 1980, Congress estab-
lished the Pre-Effectuation Review (PER) giving SSA the authority to review a certain
percentage of DDS decisions before they were paid. PER required a review of 15 percent
of Title II (DI) and concurrent (DI/SSI) allowances in 1980, 35 percent in 1982, and 65
percent in 1983 and beyond. Today, the PER sample is a sample of 50 percent of all Title II
(DI) and concurrent Title II/XVI (DI-SSI) initial allowances prior to effectuation of pay-
ment. Of the 50 percent of cases selected for review, 45 percent are targeted based on the
profile and 5 percent are randomly selected (these are the Title II and concurrent Title
II/XVI initial and reconsideration allowances selected for a quality assurance review). PER
is mandated by law and has been updated to identify and sample the most error-prone
cases for review.
In addition to the PER, the 1980 Social Security Amendments also gave SSA authority
to set performance standards for DDSs with the option of taking over DDS work-
loads, if they failed to meet those standards. The 1980 Amendments also mandated
that non-permanent disability cases must be reviewed every three years (CDRs). As a
result of the 1980 Amendments, SSA established a DDS performance accuracy thresh-
old of 90.6 percent combined accuracy rate for initial allowances and denials and began
undertaking quality assurance reviews (QARs). The 90.6 percent level was somewhat
arbitrarily chosen, based on the fact that it represented one and one-half standard devi-
ations from the mean accuracy rate at that time. If a state DDS initial allowance or
denial accuracy falls to 90 percent or less, sampling of the deficient stratum is increased
to 140 cases per quarter (reduced from 196 in May, 2000) and remains at that level
until the accuracy rate improves17. In addition, the SSA requires that DDSs meet stan-
dards of timeliness, with the target case processing time of 49.5 calendar days or less
for DI applicants and 57.9 days or less for SSI applicants. If a DDS has an accuracy
rate of less than 90 percent for two consecutive quarters but meets the timeliness stan-
dards, SSA has the discretion to decide to provide technical and management assistance
(TMA).
If a DDS has an accuracy rate of less than 90 percent and fails to meet one of the time-
liness requirements, it is deemed to have “unacceptable performance level” and the SSA
must provide TMA. If after 1-2 years performance is still unacceptable, the SSA can take
over the administration of DI determinations in that state. Although the SSA has the
statutory authority to assume responsibility for conducting disability determinations for
a state, it has never exercised this authority. The apparent reason for this is the possi-
ble political ramifications to the governors of such a move. Stapleton and Pugh (2001)
suggests that exercise of this authority was considered under the Reinvention of Gov-
ernment II initiative, in 1996, and rejected for such reasons. However, it may also be the
case that no state has ever deviated by a sufficient amount for a long enough period of
time to warrant a takeover. In this case, the threat of takeover may be sufficient to induce
state governors to apply subjective admission criteria only up to an existing threshold
level.
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3 Data
This study links Social Security Administration data from 1982 through 2013 to data
on political variables collected by Besley and Case (1995a) and Besley and Case (1995b)
for the years until 2000, and collected by ourselves after year 200018. We also collected
information on case law in various federal districts.
Given the separate data sources we divide the analysis in pre and post year 200019. The
disability application variables, reported in Panel A of Table 1, include applications and
allowance rates for individuals who apply for DI or SSI separately as well as individuals
who apply for DI and SSI combined (concurrent). The allowance rate is defined as the
number of approved applications at the DDS level divided by the total number of appli-
cations. The denominator of this outcome is reported as the number of applications for
DI and SSI separately as well as combined DI/SSI applications. Table 1 shows that about
43 percent of DI claims and 40 percent of SSI claims are accepted. Moreover, this number
has been increasing over time up until 2000. In 1982 only about 35 percent of DI applica-
tions and 20 percent of DI-SSI applications were accepted. These allowance rates rose to
a peak of 54 percent of DI applicants and 35 percent of SSI applicants both in 1992 and in
2001 (see Figures 1 and 2).
State demographic and economic variables are reported in Panel B of Table 1. The
unemployment rate averaged about 6 percent during this period though in the post-
liberalization period (after 1984) it was on average only about 5.5 percent. States vary a
great deal in their unemployment rate, however. For example, during that time period
both West Virginia (in 1985) and Louisiana (1986) had unemployment rates well over 10
Table 1 Summary statistics for disability application and state demographic variables
before 2000
N Mean Standard Dev Min Max
Panel A: disability application variables
DI applications 950 11,581 12,088 540 68,524
DI allowance rate 950 0.432 0.074 0.240 0.650
SSI applications 950 15,759 20,501 214 136,419
DI and SSI combined allowance rates 950 0.293 0.068 0.130 0.550
DI total applications (DI + concurrent applications) 950 20,907 21,353 870 139,725
DI total allowance rates (DI + concurrent rates) 950 0.371 0.070 0.200 0.620
Panel B: state demographic and economic variables
Unemployment rate 950 0.060 0.022 0.020 0.180
Unemployment rate from 1984–2000 800 0.056 0.018 0.020 0.130
Labor force participation rate 950 0.669 0.040 0.510 0.760
DI replacement rate 950 0.365 0.046 0.250 0.549
UI replacement rate 950 0.370 0.053 0.200 0.530
Real family assistance per capital ($1982) 864 0.040 0.025 0.005 0.132
Mean personal income (×1000) 950 19.496 5.744 8.990 37.547
Fraction of population below poverty line 950 0.138 0.042 0.030 0.280
Fraction of population below 100–125% of poverty 950 0.048 0.014 0.010 0.090
Fraction of population between 125 -150% of poverty 950 0.050 0.014 0.010 0.100
Percentage with health insurance coverage 950 0.754 0.057 0.560 0.880
Fraction of population that is working age 950 0.613 0.023 0.530 0.680
Fraction of population aged 5–17 912 0.191 0.017 0.070 0.269
Fraction of population married 950 0.493 0.023 0.420 0.560
Fraction of population that is white 950 0.807 0.141 0.220 1.000
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Figure 1 DI allowance rates.
percent. In contrast, in those years New Hampshire and Massachusetts had unemploy-
ment rates of well below 5 percent. Similarly, 25 percent of the population lives below 150
percent of poverty. However, this varies widely as in some states less than 10 percent of
the population lives below 150 percent of poverty (Connecticut) and in some states over
40 percent of the population lives below poverty (Mississippi). These factors are useful
in illustrating the reason why, due to various economic factors, states are likely to differ
widely in their allowance rates and the political value of a higher allowance rate.
Another source of variation in the demand for disability insurance is the relative value of
DI payments. There is considerable variation in the DI replacement rate (i.e. the average
DI payment/the average wage) as well as the unemployment insurance (UI) replacement
rate (i.e. the average UI payment/the average wage). There is also variation in the number
of people with health insurance (on average 75 percent, but as low as 55 percent.) This
is particularly relevant because individuals are eligible for Medicare 24 months after an
individual is deemed disabled. These factors regarding access to public welfare may also
influence demand and thus the political value of disability insurance.
The political variables are reported in Table 2. Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive
variables about the governors. About 60 percent of the state-years have governors serving
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Figure 2 DI-SSI allowance rates.
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Table 2 Summary statistics for political variables before 2000
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: gubernatorial descriptive variables
First term governors 895 0.607 0.489 0.000 1.000
Second term governors 895 0.306 0.461 0.000 1.000
Third term or later governors 895 0.087 0.282 0.000 1.000
Governor is a democrat 912 0.487 0.500 0.000 1.000
Governor’s age 912 53.50 7.90 34.00 78.00
Panel B: gubernatorial outcome variables
Incumbents lost re-election 234 0.128 0.335 0.000 1.000
Incumbents could not run for re-election 905 0.239 0.427 0.000 1.000
Incumbents eligible to run but did not 839 0.175 0.380 0.000 1.000
Percent of votes captured by winner 250 56.88 7.69 35.40 82.40
Governors won with a margin of greater than 10 percentage points 950 0.625 0.484 0.000 1.000
Panel C: rules impacting gubernatorial influence/power
Governors has a line-item veto 912 0.854 0.353 0.000 1.000
Super-majority requirements for tax or expenditure increase 900 0.183 0.387 0.000 1.000
State has a limitation on tax or expenditure increases 900 0.453 0.498 0.000 1.000
State has a restrictive tax/expenditure limitations 900 0.258 0.438 0.000 1.000
Panel D: other political variables
One party received more than 60 percent of votes 384 0.167 0.373 0.000 1.000
Fraction of state senate members who are democrats 891 0.573 0.176 0.114 1.000
Fraction of state house or assembly members who are democrats 892 0.567 0.173 0.157 0.952
Fraction of state senate members who are women 912 0.191 0.085 0.016 0.433
Fraction of state house or assembly members who are women 912 0.142 0.093 0.000 0.469
Governor and legislative majority are of opposite parties 912 0.475 0.500 0.000 1.000
Governor and the president are of the same party 950 0.382 0.486 0.000 1.000
Governor and the president are of different parties 950 0.618 0.486 0.000 1.000
Governor is a republican and the president is a democrat 909 0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000
Percentage of expenditures that are deficit spending 864 0.438 0.080 0.238 0.705
their first term in office. About 30 percent of the state-years have governors serving their
second term in office. About 49 percent of the state-years have democratic governors.
The average governor is about 54 years old. In addition to the descriptive variables in
Panel A, we also report some outcome variables in Panel B. Only about 13 percent of
incumbents lose re-election (either in a primary or a general election). About one-quarter
of the sample are ineligible for another term. Another 17 percent were eligible to run, but
did not do so. Thus governors who did not get re-elected even though they were eligible
for re-election represent about 30 percent of the sample.
Panel C of Table 2 reports rules which may limit gubernatorial power. Such limitation
might influence his/her ability to control state bureaucrats (and thus allowance rates).
Over 80 percent of the sample has gubernatorial line-item veto, where the governor
can eliminate individual items in omnibus legislation. Only 20 percent of the sample
has supermajority requirements to approve tax increases. 45 percent of the sample has
indexed limits on tax and expenditure changes but only 25 percent of the sample has
limits that are restrictive.
Panel D of Table 2 reports other political variables relevant for gubernatorial political
power. In 16 percent of the sample, one party received more than 60 percent of the vote
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indicating strong party ties. On average, 57 percent of state senate members and 56 per-
cent of state housemembers are democrats and indeed about 56 percent of the sample has
a democratic legislature. In general, democrats are believed to be associated with higher
government spending and in general fiscal laxness. However, we find evidence of a signif-
icantly negative relationship between having a democratic legislature and the fraction of
expenditures that are deficit funded. About 20 percent of the state senate members and
14 percent of state assembly members are women and again, there appears to be little cor-
relation with government expenditures. Higher fractions of women in political office are
sometimes thought to indicate the political liberalness of an area and would be associated
with higher spending levels. We find evidence that a higher fraction of women is associ-
ated (in a marginally significant sense) to higher rates of deficit spending. Finally, about
48 percent of the sample has a split government, where the governor and the majority of
the legislature are of opposite parties.
Panel D also reports the relationship between the governor’s party and the current pres-
ident’s party. The relationship between the governor and president’s party may relate to
career concerns of governors. Nearly 40 percent of the sample has governors who are
of the same party as the president. Of the 60 percent of the sample in which the gover-
nors and presidents are of opposite parties, about 23 percent have republican governors
and democratic presidents. The political party may be important if there are different
reputational and electoral consequences for higher welfare spending by political party.
4 Describing gubernatorial behavior
Gubernatorial behavior may be a relevant factor in disability determinations and thus
legal changes which allow greater scope for governor’s to exercise discretion may be
important in explaining differences in outcomes. Previous work has extensively docu-
mented the trends in DI and the role that this has played in US unemployment rates
(Autor and Duggan 2003). Using similar data, it is clear that increases in both accep-
tance rates and application rates contributed to the expansion of the disability program.
Figures 1 and 3 illustrate the DI allowance rates and application rates (per 1000 inhabi-
tants) (respectively) from 1982 until 2000. Figures 2 and 4 show the corresponding trends
for SSI-DI. These figures show the rates of first-term governors and single term gover-
nors in the solid and dashed lines respectively. Between 1982 and 1990 application rates
are largely flat in both single term and multi-term governors and if anything, slightly
(though not significantly) higher among first-term governors. Despite this relatively con-
stant application rate, allowance rates increased steadily from 1982–1986 among both
single term and multi-term governors. The divergence between single and multi-term
governors’ allowance rates begin in 1986 and continue through 1996. Although allowance
rates decline in states with multi-term governors between 1986 and 1988, these rates
remain constant among multi-term governors. After 1998, both groups dramatically
increase allowance rates, though somewhat more rapidly among multi-term governors,
until 1992 and then rapidly reduce allowance rates until 1996. Application rates, on the
other hand, appear to largely co-move for both single term and multi-term governors,
increasing steadily through 1994 and then decreasing after 1994. After 1996, disability
insurance allowance rates once again rise, while application rates continue to fall. Over-
all the divergence between first and multi-term governors seems to grow when allowance
rates increase, and shrink when allowance rates decrease.
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Figure 3 DI applications (per 1000 inhabitants).
Figure 5 shows that after 2001, in a period of consistent fall in allowance rates the
difference between first and multi-term governors seems to have vanished. The timing
correspondence between allowance rates and legal ruling and lack of correspondence
between applications and allowance rates raises two potential factors that may affect the
adjustment of DI allowance rates by governors. The first is flexibility. Even if a governor
wishes to adjust allowance rates for political purposes, he or she cannot do so if there
are clearly objective standards for application acceptance. Increasing allowance rates are
a clear signal that such standards are being relaxed.
The introduction of increased flexibility after 1986 increased the potential for gover-
nors to increase the allowance rates for political reasons. However, a likely second factor
is that probability of detection. If SSA monitoring was perfect, then such deviations in
allowance rates would be detected with a high probability. If there are political conse-
quences for such detection (e.g. reputational consequences) governors will not tend to
deviate from the targeted allowance rate. Put another way, for a fixed penalty from the
SSA, an increased probability of detection should reduce the willingness of governors to
deviate from the targeted allowance rate. To test this we compare states in which the fed-
eral circuit acquiesced to the SSA rulings (and saw less review and appeal and we refer to
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Figure 4 DI-SSI applications (per 1000 inhabitants).
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Figure 5 Differences in Disability Insurance (Left) and DI SSI Concurrent (Right) allowance rates
between first andmulti-term governors between 2001 and 2013.
as “lowmonitored”) to states which did not acquiesce (and saw greater review and thus we
refer to as “strictly monitored”). We find evidence consistent with this theory. The right
graph in Figure 6 shows allowance rates in strictly monitored states.
There is little divergence between single term and multi-term governors (except in
1990) and frequent crossing of the two lines. In contrast, the left graph shows allowance
rates for low monitored states. In these states, while first-term governors appear to
increase and decrease their allowance rates, multi-term governors appear to either hold
steady or increase allowance rates.
A question that then must be answered is why single term governors do not adjust
to lax monitoring in the same way as multi-term governors–i.e. why do single term
governors appear to reduce allowance rates even when monitoring is relatively low. A
key issue may be the information governors have about the targeted rate from the SSA
and what allowance rate level constitutes a small versus a large deviation from the tar-
geted rate. Second term and later governors have much more information having had
signals from the SSA about the likelihood of detection and therefore adjust DI rates
much more as economic/political needs arise. First-term governors may be wary of mov-
ing DI allowance rates in because they do not have enough information about how
the Social Security Administration will react. Thus we see much more movement and
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Figure 6 Differences in disability insurance allowance rates between first andmulti-term governors in
acquiescing (lowmonitored, left) and non-acquiescing (highlymonitored, right) federal circuit courts.
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larger differences by governor term length during periods of little scrutiny and reduced
monitoring.
4.1 Summary of the model results
We formally illustrate the role that governor term length, in the Online Appendix A. We
develop a simple model of strategic behavior between a governor and the SSA in the
context of different legal regimes for disability determinations.
Results from the strategic model suggest that for a given governor, acceptance rates in
the second period should be at least as large as in the first period. This comes simply from
the relatively simplistic monitoring and penalty tools used by the SSA in which warnings
indicate significant deviations, and thus allow governors to impose minor adjustments
and avoid any additional penalty.
First-term governors, however, will not have the benefit of this warning and thus
must start from scratch, setting allowance rates with no information on the SSA’s tar-
geted allowance rate level. Note also that this model illustrates that the utility from
deviation is going to be a key in determining the extent of deviation a governor may
wish to impose in either the first or second period, conditional on a given expected
penalty level. However, as the penalty level adjusts, for a given utility level, gover-
nors will seek to minimize the distance between the allowance rate they set in the
first period and the perceived SSA targeted allowance rate. Thus we have three main
predictions:
1. For a given governor, allowance rates should be weakly increasing over time as the
risk of detection are fixed and the returns to doing so are at least increasing.
2. For a given penalty level, governors should set higher allowance rates if the returns
to doing so are higher. This is based on a simple cost-benefit trade-off; as the
returns to increased allowance rates increases, governors will optimize conditional
on the penalty level and the more information a governor has about the targeted
allowance rate of the SSA (and thus the degree to which they risk detection for
deviating), the greater is the increased allowance rate.
3. For a given utility level, governors should set lower allowance rates as the
probability of detection increase. This tendency will be reduced the more
information a governor has about the target allowance rate of the SSA (and thus for
multi-term governors).
Prediction 3 hinges on the idea that the greater the uncertainty, the more governors
must worry that their targeted increase will trigger a penalty and warning. With per-
fect information the governor can set the maximum allowance rates at the target rate
plus the cost of take-over. Thus, the more information a governor has about the SSA
targeted rate, the less uncertainty around the maximum increased allowance rate a gov-
ernor may impose without incurring the penalty. This will thus increase deviations when
the returns are higher (because the expected costs are lower) but also reduce the effects
of changes in the probability of detection because the space over which that detection
may occur is smaller. While in our model we don’t take into account that disability appli-
cants might have an incentive to apply for benefits in the second period, we are going to
test empirically for the existence of such responses. We are also going to test alternative
relationships between political and electoral variables and allowance rates which allows
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us to explore the extent to which particular characteristics which affect the returns to
increasing allowances and the costs if detected.
5 Results on changes in disability insurance allowance rates
To test this model and determine how realistic and substantial such behavior appears
to be, we test the three predictions sequentially. To do this, we consider the effect on
allowance rates and then verify that there does not appear to be significant changes
in application rates. Table 3 shows the average allowance rates and applications by the
term number. Allowance rates, for Disability Insurance only, and for concurrent Disabil-
ity Insurance and Supplementary Security Insurance, tend to be increasing in the term
number, while applications tend to decrease. From this simple table it doesn’t seem that
applicants act strategically, applying more often when governors are in their later terms.
The other thing to notice that the large majority of governors are in their first or second
term.
Changes in the policy, training, and other factors which may influence determination
procedures are typically established by the director of DDS, a political appointee20. Since
governors are somewhat constrained in changing the appointment during the term, we
would expect this learning effect to be stifled in the first term andmore prominent in later
terms. Since very few governors are beyond their second term we include separate effects
for first-term years and later term years in office. Indeed it appears that most of the effect
is concentrated in the later years in office. This result is especially indicative because there
is state level variation in the number of years in a given term. Thus governors who have
been in office for anywhere ranging from 2 to 6 years will be “multi-term” governors if
their state has shorter term-lengths.
We move to a multivariate analysis beginning with a parsimonious specification that
regresses allowance rates on a dummy which is 1 for multi-term governor, with state and
year fixed effects21.
( # of Allowed
# of Applications
)
st
= β0 + β1(multiterm)st + δs + δt + εst (1)
Equation 1 shows the basic estimating equation of Allowance Rates on an indicator for
multi-term governors, state and time fixed effects, where s denotes state and t denotes
year, and goes from 1982 to 2000. Later we use more recent data to analyze the 2001–2013
period.
The results of this regression are reported in column (1) of Table 4. An additional term
in office increases allowance rates by about 1.31 percent or about three percent.What else
might explain the difference in allowance rates between first and subsequent terms? The
status of the economy (unemployment rates, poverty, incomes) might influence applica-
tion rates, and allowance rates, as well as re-election probabilities22. Booming economies
Table 3 Average allowance rates and applications by term number before 2000
Term Allowance rates Applications Obs.
Number DI DI+SSI DI DI+SSI
1 0.42 0.28 11,902 9,927 543
2 0.44 0.30 12,603 9,756 274
3 or more 0.46 0.31 10,006 6,869 78
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Table 4 Estimates of differences in allowance rates by gubernatorial term length before 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable Disability Insurance (DI) Concurrent (DI + SSI) Disability Insurance (DI) Concurrent (DI + SSI)
allowance rate (in %) allowance rate (in %) log-applications (in %) log-applications (in %)
Mean 43.90 30.08 892.8 870.8
=1 if multi-term governor 1.31** 1.35** 0.91** 1.67*** 1.61** 1.24*** -2.36* -0.56 0.48 -2.21 -1.15 -1.48
(0.51) (0.62) (0.43) (0.57) (0.65) (0.45) (1.38) (1.33) (1.59) (1.70) (1.65) (2.40)
=1 if governor cannot -1.28** -1.01 -0.83* -1.88*** -1.67*** -0.86* 3.46** 1.79 0.07 3.88** 3.16* 0.20
run again
(0.63) (0.63) (0.47) (0.63) (0.61) (0.45) (1.66) (1.49) (1.88) (1.87) (1.68) (2.62)
=1 if the previous governor 0.84 0.48 0.21 0.62 -0.02 2.18 -0.26 -3.43
is from the same party
(0.54) (0.43) (0.53) (0.44) (1.22) (1.84) (1.67) (2.44)
Election year 0.15 0.06 -0.12 0.48** -0.86 -1.06* 0.05 0.88
(0.31) (0.18) (0.31) (0.19) (0.71) (0.59) (0.84) (0.80)
Employed/Population 32.56** 21.04** -1.19 3.64 -261.26*** -278.19*** -226.33*** -349.03***
(16.09) (8.35) (17.59) (7.81) (31.42) (33.76) (44.35) (50.08)
Mean personal income -0.05 -0.15** -0.01 -0.25*** 0.26 1.31*** -0.44 -0.01
(0.19) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.51) (0.31) (0.54) (0.43)
% of pop below 100% of poverty level 0.72 -7.85 -7.38 -19.16*** 15.95 28.17 1.12 25.41
(11.83) (6.43) (10.40) (6.35) (22.26) (24.36) (27.85) (31.37)
% of working age pop (18≤ age ≤64) -25.99 33.05** 2.74 60.77*** -32.93 237.86*** 47.30 120.31*
(23.00) (13.12) (21.90) (13.31) (45.63) (46.76) (51.65) (64.38)
Married -8.48 -31.88*** -27.65 -42.76*** 104.62*** -19.24 -28.11 17.71
(19.29) (11.75) (18.75) (12.07) (39.94) (44.30) (48.96) (58.78)
White 1.14 10.35*** 6.42 3.32 -23.60 -239.73*** -4.40 -273.05***
(10.22) (3.23) (9.86) (2.55) (23.83) (16.92) (25.81) (24.31)
Age-adjusted-rate -0.00 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.09** 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
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Table 4 Estimates of differences in allowance rates by gubernatorial term length before 2000 (Continued)
DI replacement rate -2.38 0.77 10.71 -2.05 -110.02*** -72.10*** -203.69*** -267.26***
(12.63) (5.90) (12.25) (6.24) (31.39) (25.18) (43.19) (33.56)
UI replacement rate 1.40 -7.66 10.87 5.48 28.12 -0.92 39.02 -37.99
(6.26) (5.24) (7.99) (5.36) (18.51) (23.17) (28.70) (30.26)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustered standard errors Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N
Estimation method OLS OLS GLS OLS OLS GLS OLS OLS GLS OLS OLS GLS
Observations 749 708 708 749 708 708 749 708 708 749 708 708
R-squared 0.791 0.795 – 0.729 0.730 – 0.993 0.994 0.991 0.992 –
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (4 lags) robust standard errors at the state level in parentheses. Coefficients that are significant at the .10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***). Regressions all include additional controls
for state marriage rates and age-adjusted state death rates.
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might lead to a re-election and to a pool of more strictly disabled applicants. Recessions
might also alter the standards required by DDS decision makers.
But the estimate appears to be robust to the inclusion of a range of state-time varying
covariates including labor force participation, average income, poverty rate and demo-
graphic controls (results reported in column 2). It is also robust to the inclusion of an
election year dummy, showing that electoral cycles are not driving the results. It also does
not appear very sensitive to estimation type or corrections for serial correlation. Col-
umn (3) reports a specification using a two-step feasible GLS estimator and assuming an
AR(1) process for the error terms. The coefficient is more precisely estimated but not
significantly different than the OLS estimates.
Before discussing whether applications vary by term number (Columns 7 to 12), the
observed differences in allowance rates could be related to political survival and political
savviness. Given the strong prediction of the model that learning implies a given governor
should increase allowance rates, we estimate a specification with governor and year fixed
effects (note that state fixed effects will be subsumed in the specification). In these spec-
ification, single term governors who are never re-elected are absorbed by the governor
fixed effects. Thus, identification for the first-term effect comes from comparing gover-
nors in their first-term to later-terms, essentially treating multi-term governors as panel
observations on the same individual. This specification is shown in Equation 2 where the
equation is estimated for governor g in state s in year t.
( # of Allowed
# of Applications
)
gst
) = β0 + β1(multiterm)gst + δg + δt + εgst (2)
Table 5 reports a comparison of estimates using governor fixed effects to those using
state fixed effects. The DI only allowance rate is still lower for first-term governors rel-
ative to second term governors. Moreover, if a governor cannot run again (he or she is
prevented by term limit laws), the effect is also smaller in the governor fixed effects set-
ting, providing additional evidence of career concerns. Indeed it appears that multi-term
governors increase the allowance rates by almost 1.47 percentage points. This specifica-
tion also suggests that this may not be purely due to governor electoral survival. It does
not appear that there are high and low allowance rate governors and that high allowance
governors simply have longer term lengths. Rather, it appears that for a given governor,
as they are in office longer, they relax the standards for admission into disability insur-
ance. To further support this, we restrict the sample to governors in their first term only,
adding a dummy equal to one for governors who are going to be re-elected. From the
results reported in columns (3) and (6), the results do not seem to be driven by selec-
tion. If anything governors who are going to be re-elected have lower allowance rates.
Since all the specification control for electoral cycles the results appear more consistent
with a model of learning over time. Additionally note that allowance rates are greater if
the previous governor was of the same party. While the significance of this coefficient is
sensitive to specification, it is consistent with a story of gubernatorial learning about the
SSA targeting and monitoring strategy. If it is the case that governors of the same party
are more likely to share information and staff than governors of different party, then we
would expect some persistence in the learning if a new governor succeeds someone from
his or her own party.
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Table 5 Estimates of gubernatorial learning separate from electoral effects before 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Disability Insurance (DI) Concurrent (DI + SSI)
allowance rate (in %) allowance rate (in %)
Mean 44.02 30.15
=1 if multi-term governor 1.35** 1.47* 1.61** 1.60*
(0.62) (0.80) (0.65) (0.84)
=1 if governor will serve -0.56 -1.19
more than one term
(0.67) (0.75)
=1 if previous governor is 0.84 1.68** 1.40** 0.21 0.36 0.85
from the same party
(0.56) (0.81) (0.64) (0.53) (0.79) (0.61)
=1 if governor cannot -1.01 -1.52** -2.19** -1.67*** -1.75** -2.51***
run again
(0.63) (0.76) (1.00) (0.62) (0.80) (0.86)
Election year 0.15 0.15 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 -0.14
(0.34) (0.38) (0.40) (0.35) (0.38) (0.43)
State FE Y N Y Y N Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Governor FE N Y N N Y N
Observations 745 745 457 745 745 457
R-squared 0.795 0.878 0.842 0.730 0.842 0.775
With governor fixed effect the standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the governor level, with state fixed effects
the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (4 lags). Coefficients that are significant at the .10
[.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***). Regressions all include additional controls for year fixed effects, state marriage rates
and age-adjusted state death rates.
A natural concern is that this difference in allowance rates over a governor’s tenure
reflects a change in the underlying application base. The governor fixed effects specifica-
tion in part suggests this is not the case since for any given governor term length, there
are a range of states and years in which any given governor may be single or multiple term
governor. However, if the underlying applicant base is changing with the gubernatorial
electoral cycle, this will pose a problem for our identification. To explicitly test this, we
estimate a state fixed effect model using applications per 1000 people (in a state-year)23.
(# of Applications)gst = β0 + β1(multiterm)gst + δs + δt + εgst (3)
The results are shown in columns 7 to 12 of Table 4.We find no significant effect and the
magnitudes of the coefficients are extremely small. Given that there does not appear to be
change in the application rates across term lengths or in later term, there is less concern
that allowance rates (which is allowances divided by applications) could be changing due
to changes in the number of applicants. A remaining concern is that while the number
of applicants is not changing the type of applicant is. While there is little scope to learn
on their own experience (after all applicants apply only a few times), information might
spread through other means.
In order to test whether the application pool is changing we collected data from the
2000–2007 DI statistical supplements on the distribution of diagnostic types. In Table 6
we regress the differences over time in the Log-Number of DI beneficiaries for each diag-
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Table 6 Estimates of differences in the log-number of DI beneficiaries by diagnostic type
and by gubernatorial term length
Dep. variable Multiterm SE Multiterm SE
Change in beneficiaries State FE Governor FE
Congenital 0.01* (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Endocrinous 0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Infectious 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Injuries 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
Total mental -0.03 (0.06) -0.06 (0.08)
Retardation -0.01 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03)
Other mental -0.02 (0.05) -0.01 (0.08)
Neoplasm 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
Blood -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Circulatory system -0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Digestive system 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Genitourinary 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Musculoskeletal -0.07 (0.04) -0.04 (0.06)
Nervous 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03)
Respiratory 0.00 (0.02) -0.05** (0.02)
Skin -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Other mental 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Based on the DI statistical supplements from 2000 to 2007. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (4 lags) robust standard
errors at the state level in parentheses. Coefficients that are significant at the .10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***). All
regressions include year fixed effects, and either state or governor fixed effects.
nostic type d, on the multi-term dummy variable, controlling for year and either state or
governor fixed effects (s/g). Each coefficient βd refers to a different regression24:
 log(# of Beneficiaries)dgst = βd0 + βd1 (multiterm)gst + δs/g + δt + εgst . (4)
Less that 5 percent of the diagnostic types show significant differences between first and
multi-term governors. This finding also suggest that applicants are probably unaware of
the differences in allowance rates across terms. Otherwise, marginal applicants, who often
report musculoskeletal or back-pain problems, would have an incentive to apply when
allowance rates are higher.
The next prediction of the model is that for a given penalty level, the governor will
increase allowance rates if the return to doing so is higher. Conditional on a given penalty
level, governors may be willing to risk detection if they are more constrained in vote-
buying tools. To test this we consider state laws which reduce the fiscal freedom of
governors. There are two such laws which we consider: first, some states have laws in
which there is a tax and expenditure limitation. Twenty-five states have a law of this sort
at some point with 6 states changing the law during the 18 year sample span. Second,
some states have laws in which a supermajority of the legislature is required to approve
any funding increase. This again limits the ability of the governor to expand state-funded
programs for political returns. During the sample period, 13 states have such laws and 6
changed their laws. A separate potential restriction on the ability to pass state-funded bills
may be if the government is split, i.e. the party of the governor is different from the party of
the legislative majority. By the same logic, while there are gains from using DI, if it indeed
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serves as a vote-buying mechanism, it is also risky. Because the costs are unknown, gover-
nors who are not constrained from otherwise addressing economic conditions may prefer
not to use expand DI maximally while governors who are constrained either through
political institutions or economic factors may be forced to increase allowance rates.While
a good deal of the political economy literature focuses on unemployment and political
outcomes, it is equally plausible that governors who are constrained from social welfare
spending through political institutions may use DI as a means to improve the well-being
of individuals in their state.
To further explore the relationship between necessity and allowance rates, we estimate
regressions with state and year fixed effects within various sub-samples. The results,
reported in Table 7, highlight how as governors are constrained, either through economic
conditions or political institutions, they are more likely to use DI as a means of public
welfare. Column (1) of Table 7 provides estimates for the full sample. In states with high
unemployment rates (i.e. higher than the national median) multi-term governors have
an even higher allowance rate. This fits with the theory that governors may be using DI
as free (from a state budget perspective) way of dealing with adverse economic shocks.
The same is not true for high deficit spending states. First-term governors in states which
finance a higher percentage of their expenditures through deficits have almost the same
acceptance rate as the full sample.
In states with restrictions on tax and expenditure increases, and especially in states
with supermajority requirements for new tax or expenditure laws, multi-term governors
have much larger acceptance rates relative to first-term governors than in the sample as
a whole. This is suggestive of a more “risky” use of DI at times when governors may be
constrained from passing other legislation. If higher acceptance rates increase the chance
of SSA takeover, then the amount governors increase the acceptance rates by in their
second term will be influenced by their ability to pass other interventions (obviating the
need for a large increase in DI acceptances)25.
Note that republican governors show an even larger multi-term effect than the aver-
age multi-term governor. This may be related to two factors. First, republican gov-
ernors may be in states in which there is a greater distaste for state spending and
tax increases. This means that the governor has few options if he or she wishes to
expand social protection. Second, republican governors career concerns may be such
that higher state deficits are more detrimental than greater usage of federal programs.
As a result, republican governors appear to be quite willing to use federal public welfare
programs.
In an additional exercise we analyze the four distinct periods of rules, 1982–1985,
1986–1992, and 1993–2000, separately. Table 8 shows that the largest multi-term changes
in acceptance rates are between 1993 and 2000 for DI and between 1987 and 2000 for
concurrent (DI and SSI). This is in line with the 1986 introduction in court ruling of
evidence from treating physicians (rather than SSA physicians). The divergence contin-
ued to grow until 1993 when evidentiary standards on pain were tightened and closed
almost entirely by the end of the 1990s when the SSA issued a set of unifying evaluation
criteria.
Do these results hold in more recent years, when allowance rates started falling steadily
over time? In line with Figure 5 the simple answer is no. Controlling for state or governor
fixed effects as well as year fixed effects does not resuscitate the difference in allowance
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Table 7 Estimates of differences in allowance rates by gubernatorial term length for subgroups before 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample restricted to states in years in which they have
Full sample Unemployment % of expenditures Split government Restrictions Super-majority Republican Governor with
rate above which are deficit (governor and on tax and requirements for governor line-item veto
national median spending above legislative expenditure new tax or (Can reject
unemployment average % of majority of increases expenditure laws single items
deficit spending opposite parties) in legislation)
Panel A: dependent variable is Disability Insurance (DI) only allowance rate
=1 if multi-term governor 1.35** 2.44*** 1.10* 1.35 1.92** 3.20*** 2.52*** -0.14
(0.62) (0.87) (0.61) (0.87) (0.81) (1.10) (0.93) (1.01)
=1 if the previous governor is from the same party 0.84 2.62*** 0.33 0.74 1.74** 0.90 1.12 0.99
(0.56) (1.00) (0.73) (0.81) (0.74) (1.23) (0.88) (0.97)
=1 if governor cannot run again -1.01 -2.88*** -1.15 -2.59*** -1.24 -4.38*** -2.76*** -0.75
(0.63) (0.90) (0.73) (0.85) (0.92) (1.01) (1.05) (1.02)
Panel B: dependent variable is concurrent (DI + SSI) allowance rate
=1 if multi-term governor 1.61** 1.71** 1.48* 1.80* 2.10** 3.34*** 2.32*** 0.02
(0.65) (0.85) (0.78) (0.92) (0.93) (1.08) (0.85) (1.20)
=1 if the previous governor is from the same party 0.21 1.38 0.12 0.54 1.03 0.44 0.63 0.57
(0.53) (0.86) (0.73) (0.83) (0.72) (1.03) (0.81) (1.09)
=1 if governor cannot run again -1.67*** -2.21** -1.76** -3.02*** -1.79* -3.51*** -2.70*** -0.79
(0.62) (0.92) (0.81) (0.86) (0.97) (0.94) (0.98) (1.19)
Observations 745 265 329 371 317 144 368 287
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (4 lags) robust standard errors at the state level in parentheses. Coefficients that are significant at the .10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***). Regressions all include additional controls
for state marriage rates and age-adjusted state death rates.
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Table 8 Estimates of differences in allowance rates by gubernatorial term length for three
different time periods: 1982–86, 1987–92, 1993–00
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Disability Concurrent Disability Concurrent
Insurance (DI) (DI + SSI) Insurance (DI) (DI + SSI)
allowance allowance log-applications log-applications
rate (in %) rate (in %) (in %) (in %)
=1 if multiterm in 1982–85 0.70 0.55 -0.47 -5.60*
(1.23) (1.45) (2.54) (3.39)
=1 if multiterm in 1987–92 1.16* 1.92*** -0.06 0.56
(0.67) (0.68) (1.46) (1.82)
=1 if multiterm in 1993–00 1.93*** 1.76** -1.25 -1.05
(0.71) (0.69) (1.79) (2.15)
State FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Clustered standard errors Y Y Y Y
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 745 745 745 745
R-squared 0.796 0.730 0.994 0.992
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (4 lags) robust standard errors at the state level in parentheses. Coefficients that are
significant at the .10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***). Regressions all include additional controls for state marriage rates
and age-adjusted state death rates.
rates (Table 9). Governors appear to be influencing allowance rates only when the DDS’s
decision process becomes more lax and allowance rates increase.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we exploit the conflicting incentives for both parties involved in the man-
agement of the disability system. On one side, the federal government has an interest in
reducing costs, while on the other side, state governors have a vote-buying incentive to
increase caseloads. Given that governors want tominimize costs with respect to their own
social programs, they have an interest to have marginal individuals receive federal dis-
ability funding. The removal of these individuals from the ranks of the unemployed helps
change perceptions about the state economic performance, thus affecting a governor’s
re-election prospects.
Our results provide fairly strong evidence that governors in their second and subse-
quent terms allow higher acceptance rates for federal Disability Insurance (DI).We believe
this inefficiency is due to the inherently imperfect principal-agent situation set up the by
the administration of DI. In particular, because the federal government funds DI but to
a large extent leaves the management and administration to state government, there is
broad scope for gubernatorial discretion to influence the allowance rates. The irony of
such a scenario is that the monitoring by the Social Security Administration (SSA) actu-
ally may serve to inform governors about the extent to which they can costlessly increase
DI. The evidence presented here suggests that the same governors, over time, might
increase their allowance rates once they learn how much room they have to increase the
rates.
We also provide some evidence confirming the vote-buying use of DI by comparing
governors who have a greater incentive to use DI as a political tool. In particular, we find
that governors of states with higher than average unemployment rates have larger effects
in their first term. Moreover, governors who are restricted in their ability to pass social
Iyengarand
M
astrob
uoniIZA
JournalofLaborPolicy
2014,3:16
Page
25
of31
http
://w
w
w
.izajolp
.com
/content/3/1/16
Table 9 Estimates of differences in allowance rates by gubernatorial term length between 2001 and 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Disability Insurance (DI) Concurrent (DI + SSI)
Allowance rates Log-applications Allowance rates Log-applications
=1 if multi-term governor -1.20 -0.20 1.25 -3.69** -1.11 -0.16 -0.58 -1.09
(0.92) (1.45) (1.50) (1.86) (0.95) (1.38) (1.84) (2.59)
=1 if governor cannot run again 0.50 -1.49 -0.01 1.55 0.60 -1.83 -0.84 -0.57
(1.12) (1.67) (1.78) (2.47) (1.14) (1.70) (2.45) (3.39)
Constant 45.62*** 53.89*** 974.42*** 909.44*** 28.60*** 34.67*** 966.37*** 888.60***
(1.16) (0.84) (4.77) (2.42) (0.88) (0.72) (2.94) (2.52)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y N Y N Y N Y N
Governor FE N Y N Y N Y N Y
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R-squared 0.720 0.881 0.996 0.998 0.703 0.883 0.992 0.996
Observations 618 618 618 618 618 618 618 618
Based on 2001–2013 data file SSA-SA-MOWL found on www.data.gov. All regressions include year fixed effects, and either state or governor fixed effects. With governor fixed effect the standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the governor level, with state fixed effects the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (4 lags). Coefficients that are significant at the .10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***).
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welfare programs (either because of political institutions or a split with the legislature)
have higher DI allowance rates after the first term. This is consistent with our model
of learning and also suggests that there may indeed be some costs to using DI as a
vote-buying mechanism.
The results of this paper provide some insight into the ways in which DI administration
can be responsible for reduced labor force participation. In a world with perfect infor-
mation and monitoring, governors could not use disability insurance as a means of vote
buying because individuals who were not sufficiently disabled would not be allowed onto
the DI rolls. This paper identifies a specific mechanism for how misclassifications and
state inconsistencies may underlie misuses of social welfare program by political figures.
The average estimates presented in this paper account for about 3 percent of the DI rise
and 5 percent of the concurrent DI and SSI rise over the two-decade time period exam-
ined in this paper26. However, much of the difference occurred over the same time period
as the rise in DI rolls suggesting that this political effect may be particularly relevant for
the rise in DI and its implications for labor force participation. Moreover, while we iden-
tify governors as a source for the politicization of DI, there may be other ways in which
state politicians exploit the inherent principle-agent problem set up by the administration
of the federal DI programs.
There are a number of caveats worth noting. First, although we identify a potential
source of inefficiencies due to the federal-state, principal-agent problem, we cannot deter-
mine whether higher or lower allowance rates would be optimal. Second, although we
underscore a labor-market spillover, in terms of increased allowance rates reducing the
total number of employable individuals, this does not directly imply changes in the labor
force participation rate. In particular, although the natural implication of gubernatorial
motivations to relax allowance standards would be to reduce the unemployment rate both
by reducing the number of people seeking work and the number of people in the labor
force, the specific relationship between political motivations and labor force participation
rates is left as an area for future research.
Overall, the changes we find are both significant and substantial. Unfortunately, we
are not able to make strong statements about the social welfare impact of this politi-
cization of DI allowances because we have little information about who is being allowed
onto the rolls. If governors are simply providing some form of social insurance or
long-term unemployment insurance for individuals who cannot work and might oth-
erwise suffer severe financial hardship then this use of DI to provide a stop-gap safety
net may be net-beneficial. On the other hand, if individuals who would otherwise be
employed or actively seeking employment are entering DI, then the program may be
quite socially costly. The social welfare implications of the rise in DI rolls and its rela-
tionship to this particular mechanism for that rise are therefore left as an area of future
research. However, the results provide a cautionary tale for governments seeking to
reduce costs from administration. Monitoring in the form of low-cost, non-credible
threats is not simply ineffective but may actually be counter-productive. In this case,
the monitoring system could facilitate misuse of the system and higher DI rolls, likely
far outweighing the costs needed to more effectively monitor state determination ser-
vices. Thus we would recommend minimizing the principal-agent problem through
either federalization of DI or a more strict monitoring system with credible, costly
penalties.
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Endnotes
1Even popular guides such as Nolo’s Guide (Morton 2004) discuss the possibility that
DDS directors may be influenced by political concerns and thus amenable to more
lenient allowance policies. In addition, several reports by the Social Security Advisory
Boards express concern over this conflict of interest.
2Cohen and King (2004) find that when the state unemployment is lower than the
national average, governors lose political capital and face worse approval ratings.
Approval ratings are important not only because they are a key indication of re-election
prospects (King 2001) but also because they expand the executive’s ability to set their
own policy agenda (Canes-Wrone and De Marchi 2002).
3Honig (2013) finds that Democratic governors are associated with higher allowance
rates.
4There is also some evidence that learning within party lines tends to be faster.
5In particular, there is evidence that political institutions matter for policy outcomes.
In addition, whether an official is appointed or elected does impact the performance of
these officials. See Besley and Case (2003) for an overview on political institutions and
expenditures and see for example Peltzman (1992) on vote buying behavior.
6For example, Bound (1989) finds only small disincentive effects from DI. In contrast,
Gruber and Kubik (1997) and Autor and Duggan (2003), find a significant effect on labor
force participation which appears concentrated among the low-skilled.
7For many people, the true value of disability insurance is not just the monthly
income. Individuals covered under disability insurance are also entitled to Medicare (for
DI recipients after a 2 year waiting period) and Medicaid (for SSI recipients).
8In fact, the program functions on a credit system which takes account of both how
long an individual worked and the time period an individual worked. The number of
work credits needed for disability benefits depend on the age of disability.
9Social Security Administration Disability Insurance “Red Book,” emphasis added.
10It bears mentioning that the substantial gainful activity earnings restrictions only
refer to money obtained from working and does not restrict income from investments.
Thus a disabled individual may have income independent of his or her DI benefits.
11This liberalization resulted in greater consideration of mental illness, increased
weight placed on symptoms such as pain, and acceptance of diagnoses and evidence
from personal physicians of applicants, among other changes. For greater discussion on
the effects of liberalization, see Autor and Duggan (2003).
12A detailed discussion of the original and current structure of the DI program is
available in Social Security Advisory Board (2001).
13Court cases include Schisler v. Bowen, 787 F. Supp. 76 (2 Cir.1986), which dealt with
treating source opinion, and Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985 (4 Cir. 1986), which dealt
with assessment of pain.
14GAO Report to Senator Jim Sasser (General Accounting Office Report to Senator
Jim Sasser 1985).
15See Finnegan v. Mathews and Patti v. Schweiker.
16For detailed discussion of the response of various circuit courts to SSA standards as
well as comparison of appeals rates, see Haire and Lindquist (1997).
17State DDS performance and compliance with federal policy is measured by the
findings of the QARs. Only Group I deficiencies (a decisional deficiency with sufficient
documentation to support an opposite decision, or a documentation deficiency where
the medical documentation is not sufficient to support any disability decision) are used
in the calculation of performance accuracy, provided that the DDS also failed to meet
processing time standards for either Title II or Title XVI.
18Social Security Administration State-level disability data between 2001 and 2013
were downloaded from www.data.gov. The file is named SSA-SA-MOWL.
19It turns out that 2001 represents also the year where the trend in allowance rates
reversed.
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20The Director of Disability Determination Services is typically appointed by the
governor and approved by the legislature. The SSA has no official input into the
nomination or appointment of these individuals. Some states have considered this office
sufficiently important that the Director of DDS sits on the governor’s cabinet.
21We also tried specification that use year in office as the main independent variable
but in line with the constraints faced by governors the entire effect is driven by changes
in the term.
22Rupp and Stapleton (1995), and Rupp (2012), and Strand (2002) provide evidence
that demographic and health factors shape allowance rates.
23Coe et al. (2011) analyze factors that shape application rates.
24 We use the changes in the number of beneficiaries because the supplements do not
contain information about applicants or allowed.
25The specifications reported in Table 7 use individual subgroups for clarity of
discussion. Results from a pooled regression are similar and there are no significant
interactive effects between the subgroups (although there are likely too few observations
to get sufficient statistical power to identify any interactive effects).
26We derive this number multiplying the multi-term effect by the application rates,
assuming there are no general equilibrium effects on applications.
A Online appendix
A.1 Basic setup of the model
To begin, suppose the governor has utility U (x), where x = a − assa and represents the
difference between the allowance rate set by the governor (a) and SSA’s desired allowance
rate (assa). SSA observes x. SSA can take one of three actions: i) do nothing, ii) send a
warning (s = 1), and iii) impose technical and management assistance or completely take
over the administration (in short take over, t = 1). To decide which action to take, SSA
follows these rules:
• send a warning if x > c −  (i.e. define a variable such that s = 1 (x > c − ))
• take over disability determination if x > c (i.e. define a variable such that
t = 1 (x > c)).
In these rules c represents the cost to the SSA of taking over any DDS and  is the
amount by which SSA shades the true costs of takeover in order to ensure compliance. For
illustrative purposes we will treat as exogenously given27. Assume that governors know
, but don’t know c28. That is, we assume that governors know how much SSA will shade
by but they do not know the true cost of takeover. Also, assume that if x > c governors
utility is zero (i.e. U(x) = 0 for) the period and any period after. That is governors receive
zero utility in this period and future periods if SSA takes over and as such governors will
always avoid setting x > c.
In a one period model the governor weights the utility gain from setting a higher accep-
tance rate against the increase in the probability of takeover29. In a two period model,
however, information is transmitted based on the SSA’s action in the previous period. The
governors will therefore maximize their utility over both periods, i.e.
max
x0,x10,x11
U (x0, x10, x11) = Pr (t0 = 0)U (x0) + Pr (t0 = 0, t1 = 0, s = 0)U (x10)
+ Pr (t0 = 0, t1 = 0, s = 1)U (x11) .
(5)
where x0 is the difference between SSA’s desired allowance rate and the allowance rate set
by the governor at time τ = 0, x10 is the difference between SSA’s desired allowance rate
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and the allowance rate set by the governor at time τ = 1 if the governor does not receive a
warning, and x11 difference between SSA’s desired allowance rate and the allowance rate
set by the governor at time τ = 0 if the governor receives a warning.
A.2 Solving the governor’s maximization problem
Suppose that c has a known distribution, F(c), which admits a density f (c). Substituting in
the distribution function for the probabilities, the expected utility in Equation 5 simplifies
to:
[1 − F (x0)]U (x0) + [1 − F (x10)]U (x10) + [F (x0 + ) − F (x11)]U (x11) (6)
Suppose the governor maintains the administration of the disability program (i.e. t0 =
0, t1 = 0, s = 1) and he received a warning, then x11 is implicitly defined by:
argmax
x1
P (c > x11|c > x0, s)U (x) = (1 − F (x11|x0 < c < x0 + ))U (x11) (7)
The first order condition from Equation 7 is:
(1 − F (x11|x0 < c < x0 + ))U1 (x11,α) − f (x11|x0 < c < x0 + )U (x11) = 0
or more simply:
(F (x0 + ) − F (x11))U1 (x11) − f (x11)U (x11) = 0 (8)
In a parallel manner the governor’s strategy in the state of the world where there is no
warning at time (i.e. t0 = 0, t1 = 0, s = 0) is implicitly defined by the first order condition:
(1 − F (x10))U1 (x10) − f (x10)U (x10) = 0 (9)
Let x∗10 and x∗11 be the solutions to these two maximization problems. We can then
rewrite Equation 6 as:
[1 − F (x0)]U (x0) +
[
1 − F (x∗10)]U (x∗10) + [F (x0 + ) − F (x∗11)]U (x∗11) (10)
with corresponding first order condition:
0 = [1 − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0)
+ {[1 − F (x∗10)]U1 (x∗10) − f (x∗10)U (x∗10)} x′∗10 (x0)
+ {[F (x0 + ) − F (x∗11)]U1 (x∗11 (x0)) − f (x∗11)U (x∗11)} x′∗11 (x0)
+ f (x0 + )U
(
x∗11
)
(11)
In Equation 11, x′∗10 (x0) is the change in the second period solution (without warning)
with respect to x0, and similarly x′∗11 (x0) is the change in the second period solution (with
a warning) with respect to x0.
Note that these first order conditions (Equations 8, 9, and 11) cannot be simultaneously
satisfied. If they were all satisfied we would be left with
0 = [1 − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0) + f (x0 + )U
(
x∗11
)
(12)
Define G (x0) = [1 − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0). Equation 12 then implies that
G(x0) < 0. However, we have assumed G
(
x∗10
) = 0. Because of the regularity condi-
tion G (z) is decreasing, implying that x∗10 < x0, which cannot be optimal. Governors will
never set x1 < x0 if there was no takeover in the initial period (i.e., governors should
always set x1 ≥ x0).
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Consider a case where governors choose the interior solution if they do not receive a
warning, so that G
(
x∗10
) = 0. If there is a warning instead, governors pursue the safest
strategy and maintain the same acceptance rate in the second period (i.e. if s = 1, then
x∗11 = x0). In this situation, we can rewrite the first order condition:
0 = G (x0) + [F (x0 + ) − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0) + f (x0 + )U (x0) (13)
In order for Equation 13 to hold, G (x0) + [F (x0 + ) − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)
U (x0) < 0 . Since x∗10 > x0 and G(z) is decreasing in z, we know that G (x0) > 0. This
implies that F (x0 + ) − F (x0)U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0) < 0.
Note however that this implies that:
G (x0) −
∣∣[F (x0 + ) − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0)∣∣ > 0 ⇒
G (x0) −
(− {[F (x0 + ) − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0)}) > 0 ⇒
G (x0) + [F (x0 + ) − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0) > 0
Thus there does not exist an interior solution where after a warning the governor will
set the acceptance rate at the same level. Intuitively this results indicates that because
governors know they still have some room to increase their acceptance rates and the
warning itself does not impose any costs (so getting another warning without a takeover
is costless), it is not optimal for them to simply maintain the status quo when given a
warning.
Next, consider a case where governors choose the optimal x1 if they receive a warning
(i.e. the first order condition for x∗11 is satisfied). If there is no warning, governors simply
increase by  (i.e. x∗10 = x0 + ). Note that since  is known, and the strategy of the
SSA is known, governors know they can safely increase by  and still avoid takeover.
Additionally, G
(
x∗11
)
> 0. Since we know that x∗11 > x0, this implies that G (x0) > 0. The
first order conditions can then be written as:
0 = G (x0) + G (x0 + ) + f (x0 + )U
(
x∗11
)
0 = [F (x0 + ) − F (x∗11)]U1 (x∗11) − f (x∗11)U (x∗11)
(14)
The first condition can be satisfied if G (x0 + ) is sufficiently negative. In this case,
governors will always choose x11 > x0 and the warning by the SSA simply dictates the
magnitude of the increase30.
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